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#METOO, DUE PROCESS, AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION: THE PERFECT STORM
FOR FUNCTIONAL STATE LEVEL ARBITRATION REFORM
By
Kaci Dupree*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2017, a bipartisan group of senators including Democrat Kirsten Gillibrand
and Republican Lindsey Graham introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment
Act (“the Act”). The Act would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to make arbitration
agreements in employment contracts regarding Title VII claims unenforceable.1 On the same day,
another bipartisan group introduced a version of the bill in the House of Representatives which, if
enacted, would function in the same manner as the Senate bill.2 Lawmakers introduced the Act in
response to the MeToo movement and public outcry over the sexual harassment scandals involving
Harvey Weinstein and other prominent figures in Hollywood, government, and business.3 The Act
enjoys bipartisan support in Congress and the support of the Attorneys General of all fifty states,
the US territories, and the District of Columbia as a result of the prominent position sexual
harassment currently occupies in the public discourse.4
However, it is unlikely that major reform of the FAA will occur in any manner other than
through legislation due to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding adhesive arbitration
agreements in the consumer and employment contexts, and its generally favorable view of
arbitration.5 Passing the Act and other similar legislation is seen by groups like the National
Association of Attorneys General as a key way to ensure that victims of sexual harassment receive
the due process and access to justice that can be denied to claimants by mandatory arbitration.6
*Kaci Dupree is a J.D. candidate at Penn State Law, class of 2020, and Managing Editor of the Penn State
Arbitration Law Review.
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Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017).

2

Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, H.R. 4570, 115th Cong. (2017).

See Susan Sholinsky, #MeToo’s Impact on Sexual Harassment Law Just Beginning, Law360, (July 11, 2018)
(actress Alyssa Milano’s tweet asking any woman who had been sexually harassed to respond in a tweet and share
her story launched the MeToo movement, prompting lawmakers nationwide to propose legislation, including the
Act, designed to protect victims in a variety of contexts including the workplace).
3

4

Sarah Gruber and Salvatore G. Gangemi, Attorneys General Support Ending Arbitration of Workplace Sexual
Harassment Claims, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, (February 20, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/attorneys-general-support-ending-arbitration-workplace-sexual-harassmentclaims.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 4th ed., 69 (“… they [lower courts] contested the
legality and desirability of adhesive arbitration. The Court appeared to be convinced that, if any exceptions to
arbitrability were to be made, arbitration would cease to resolve effectively the problems of civil litigation.”)
5

6

Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House, Mitch McConnell,
Senate Majority Leader, Charles Schumer, Senate Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader (February
12, 2018) (“victims of such serious misconduct should not be constrained to pursue relief from decision makers
who are not trained as judges, are not qualified to act as courts of law, and are not positioned to ensure that such
victims are accorded both procedural and substantive due process.”)
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Unfortunately, like other congressional attempts to reform the arbitration system such as the
Arbitration Fairness Act,7the Act is unlikely to advance out of committee in either house because
Congress is generally unwilling to interfere with the Court’s expansive arbitration regime.8
As the passage of federal legislation amending the FAA is unlikely, state legislators should
pass legislation that would protect employees that bring sexual harassment claims and would
provide the due process that every state attorney general has advocated for.9 Although the Supreme
Court has established that the FAA preempts contradictory state law,10states can and should enact
legislation. States could provide a functional framework at the state level to take advantage of the
perfect storm that encourages policies that protect sexual harassment victims that has developed
as the result of the ongoing MeToo movement without taking away the ability to arbitrate if both
of the parties so choose.
II.

ADHESIVE ARBITRATION: THE GREAT DEBATE
A. The Development of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence

Prior to the FAA’s passage, courts in the United States expressed disdain towards the
practice of arbitration.11 Courts were also far less likely than modern courts to uphold an agreement
to arbitrate because judges at the time viewed arbitrators as unqualified decision-makers.12 A
dismissive attitude towards arbitration as an inadequate forum for redress of claims was fairly
typical of the judiciary at the time and was a large part of the impetus for the passage of the FAA.13
However, Congress did not vote for the FAA in 1924 solely to correct the judicial bias against
arbitration; legislators also sought to create a procedural framework that would enable primarily
commercial parties to expediently resolve disputes between themselves without having to resort

7

See Carbonneau, supra note 5, 72-73 (describing the Fairness in Arbitration Act as one of many failed
Congressional attempts to decrease the reach of the Court’s arbitrability jurisprudence and reform the arbitration
system).
Id., at 72 (“There appears to be a tacit understanding between the Court and the U.S. Congress that arbitration falls
within the Court’s exclusive bailiwick.”)
8

9

Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 6.

10

See generally Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
11

See Thomas E. Carbonneau, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 51 (West, 7th ed.,
2012), (“Arbitration, in their [the courts’] view, was makeshift justice. Courts were reluctant to compel parties to
arbitrate.”)
See Carbonneau, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 51, (quoting Justice Story: “when
courts are asked to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award shall be final, they necessarily pause to
consider whether such tribunals possess adequate means of giving redress… and to close against him the doors of
justice…”).
12

Id., at 61 (“According to the Court, [in Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)] the FAA was
enacted by Congress to eliminate the ‘hostility of American courts to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.’”)
13

189

to costly and time-consuming litigation.14 In reality, the FAA was special interest litigation brought
to Congress by sophisticated commercial parties and was intended to make it easier for merchants
and other commercial parties to arbitrate their disputes with minimal judicial interference.15 The
FAA provides a procedural mechanism for selecting arbitrators, judicial enforcement of awards,
and gives arbitrators the power to compel witnesses to testify.16
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has expanded its jurisprudence since the inception of the
FAA to protect a right to arbitrate in a diverse score of situations. A key factor in the development
of arbitration jurisprudence was the establishment of the separability doctrine in the 1960s.17 The
Court ordered the district courts to uphold arbitration agreements, so long as the arbitration clause
was valid, even when the remainder of the contract would be invalid.18 Subsequently, the Court
further expanded the applicability of the FAA by striking down a California law that exempted
franchise disputes from arbitration and held that Congress created a substantive body of law when
it enacted the FAA and intended to prevent state legislators from passing legislation designed to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.19 In 1983, the court further solidified its
position by holding that “…as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”20 By the end of the 1980s, the Court’s
position with respect to arbitration had become fairly clear: there was a strong, emphatic, liberal
federal policy in favor of arbitration.21

Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for Unsophisticated Consumers’ and Employees’ Contractual
Rights? - Legal and Empirical Analyses of Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of
Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 25 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J.
143, 165 (2016) (“the congressional record clearly reveals that Congress enacted the FAA for other reasons: (1) to
allow sophisticated merchants to fashion voluntary arbitration agreements; (2) to encourage courts to enforce
arbitration agreements; (3) to increase merchants’ ability to resolve trade disputes efficiently by eliminating
expensive litigation; and (4) to “preserve business friendships” within and between various trade associations.”)
14

Carbonneau, supra note 12 (stating that the FAA was originally drafted by the American Bar Association’s
Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law to encourage the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
commercial contexts).
15

16

9 U.S.C. §5, §7, §10.

17

See Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that the arbitration clause is
“seperable” from the main contract. Therefore, even where the main contract could be challenged, the arbitration
clause could still be valid).
Id. at 403 (“The federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.”)
18

See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1980) (“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”)
19

20

460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

21

See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (“in enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”)
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B. The States Fight Back: Resistance to Enforcing Arbitration Clauses
After the Court solidified its stance in favor of arbitration, corporations began to take
advantage of arbitration’s strong position by inserting pre-dispute arbitration agreements into their
consumer contracts.22 The increasing addition of mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer
context gave rise to a conflict between state and lower federal courts and the Supreme Court as to
their validity.23 Some courts regularly invalidated mandatory arbitration clauses on the grounds
of unconscionability.24 Similarly, states courts differed with the Supreme Court over whether or
not employees and consumers could be required to arbitrate statutory rights (such as civil rights).25
The FAA contains the so-called “savings clause,” which appears to carve out an exception to
arbitrability where at law or equity the contract would be considered invalid.26 Many courts have
traditionally relied on the savings clause exemption in order to invalidate arbitration agreements
on unconscionability grounds.27 However, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,28 the Court made it
more difficult for states to invalidate arbitration agreements even when they were imposed
unilaterally or could be invalidated on state law grounds.29 The Court held that state laws which
allowed invalidation for unconscionability directly opposed the federal policy favoring
arbitration.30
The majority of opposition to enforcing arbitration agreements has come from California
and the Ninth Circuit.31 In the view of these courts, agreements to arbitrate were considered
See e.g. Green Tree Fin Corp. – Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (where an adhesive agreement to
arbitrate between a consumer and a corporation was at issue).
22

See Carbonneau, supra note 5 (“an ideological war developed between the U.S. Supreme Court and a number of
lower federal and state courts in which the lower courts criticized the Court’s support for arbitration- in particular,
they contested the legality and desirability of adhesive arbitration.”)
23

See e.g. Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc. 609 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (which states that “arbitration
provisions that confer an unfair advantage upon the party with greater bargaining power are substantively
unconscionable.”) (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F. 3d 256 269 (3d 2003)).
24

25

See e.g. Litle v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003) (discussing the validity of mandatory
arbitration of federal and state statutory claims.)
See 9 U.S.C. §2 (“An agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”)
26

27

For a discussion of the traditional unconscionability defense to arbitration agreements, see Tillman v. Commer.
Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 2008).
28

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).

29

Id.

See Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 151 (“although these agreements [at issue in AT&T] prevented consumers with
modest ends from pursuing their right of recovery, the court held that state law policies about unconscionability
were in direct opposition to the ‘strong emphatic public policy in favor of arbitration’.”)
30

31

See e.g. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir 2002) and see e.g. Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)(superseded by statute) (holding that the FAA did not preempt the
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fundamentally unfair when they were imposed unilaterally, and arbitration itself represented a
compromise of the courts’ fundamental role in American law as protectors of the public’s rights.32
In terms of employment arbitration, the California Supreme Court has argued that in order to be
valid, arbitration agreements which would mandate that employees arbitrate statutory claims are
subject to requirements of minimum fairness.33
The FAA also provides an exclusion in section one for certain classes of workers.34 Some
courts based their rulings on the FAA’s employment exclusion in order to exclude workers’
contracts from mandatory arbitration clauses.35 However, the Supreme Court has held that this
clause only implicates certain workers in interstate commerce, such as transportation workers, but
does not exclude arbitration agreements in employment contracts for any other workers involved
in interstate commerce, causing the employment exclusion’s significance to decrease over time.36
As a result of this interpretation, very few workers’ contracts are actually excluded from the FAA,
and pre-dispute agreements signed by employees are likely to be upheld.37

California courts from refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that was unconscionable under California law, and
that unconscionability had both procedural and substantive elements which could be implicated in class action
waivers in arbitration agreements).
Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 68 (“[the view in California is that] private parties should not be empowered to alter
the creation and attribution of judicial jurisdiction and private arbitrators should not be substituted for judges in the
performance of judicial tasks.”)
32

33

See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 24 Cal. 4th 83 (Cal. 2000) ((quoting Cole v. Burns
Intern. Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465,1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Such an arbitration agreement is lawful if it ‘(1)
provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4)
provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees
to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.
Thus, an employee who is made to use arbitration as a condition of employment 'effectively may vindicate [his or
her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum’.”)
See 9 U.S.C. §1 (“… but nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”)
34

35

See e.g. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that where the FAA did not apply to
an employment contract, the court could not compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement.)
Matthew Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under The United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical
Clarification, 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 282, at 294 (“… the United States Supreme Court has more recently
interpreted the word "involving" to be as broad as the word "affecting" commerce, i.e., as expressing the full reach
of the Commerce power. Thus, the argument is that employees referred to as "engaged" in commerce had a welldeveloped meaning limited to those who either transported goods or were so closely connected to such transport so
as to be practically part of it. Employees who "affected" commerce included not only transport workers "but also all
workers involved in the manufacture or production of interstate goods." Consequently, the argument runs, when
Congress chose to exempt only the former, it left the latter covered by the Act.”)
36

Id. at 298. (explaining that “The U.S.A.A. exempts contracts of employment, all contracts of employment, over
which Congress had constitutional authority. The scope of the commerce power when the U.S.A.A. was enacted was
quite narrow; in the employment setting, it was limited largely to transportation workers. Thus in 1925, the U.S.A.A.
could not have applied to an arbitration provision in the employment contract of a neo-natal physician, a
manufacturing manager, or a secretary in a law firm, because these employees would not have been considered as
being in interstate commerce. As the commerce power has been expanded by the United States Supreme Court, the
37
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C. “The law is clear”: The Supreme Court Reaffirms its Arbitration Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear in recent years that there are very few
limitations regarding what types of contracts may include arbitration agreements despite the
historical disagreement in the lower courts over the legitimacy of adhesive arbitration agreements.
The Supreme Court has reinforced this view by making it nearly impossible to challenge this type
of arbitration agreement in recent decisions.38 The Court has held that the FAA applies in state
courts and that states must place arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contracts, greatly
decreasing the options available to states to regulate the enforcement of arbitration clauses
specifically.39 For example, in response to a California decision not to allow class action waivers
in pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court held that allowing class arbitration would
serve to impede arbitration proceedings, a result which would be in opposition to the federal policy
favoring arbitration.40 The Court also held that arbitration agreements are enforceable against
employees who wish to bring statutory claims against employers as long as the statute does not
indicate that Congress intended to exclude arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism for claims
that arise under it.41 Even when a federal agency might bring a court case on behalf of an employee
seeking to address civil rights claims, the court has upheld an adhesive agreement for that
employee to arbitrate the same claims.42 Most recently, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,43 the
Supreme Court upheld class action waivers in adhesive employment contracts because there is a
clear Congressional directive to uphold arbitration agreements as written.44 The Epic Systems
decision only reinforces the position that as a matter of federal law, arbitration agreements are
likely to be enforced no matter the circumstances under which they were agreed to.
In the wake of these decisions, it is clearer than ever that the Supreme Court is likely to
uphold agreements to arbitrate even when, as in the Epic Systems decision, “the policy may be
exemption has expanded along with it… the judicial policy toward arbitration has rendered the courts amenable to
giving the Act a more sweeping application.”)
38

Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 230.

Allied- Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“what states may not do is decide that a
contract is fair enough in to enforce in all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its
arbitration clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful….”)
39

40

See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 347-48 (2011) (explaining that the very nature of class
arbitrations, which would involve numerous parties and formal procedures to protect them necessarily violates the
policy favoring arbitration because it reduces the informal process to the equivalent of a civil trial.)
41

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

42

EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that the EEOC, as a third party, is not subject to the
arbitration agreement and may bring a court case on the employee’s behalf but the arbitration agreement between the
employer and employee is not invalidated).
43

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (May 21, 2018).

Id. at 1632 (“the policy may be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements
like those before us be enforced as written.”)
44
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debatable.”45 The Supreme Court’s reinforcement of arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution
system has brought arbitration into favor as a mechanism by which companies may settle disputes
with their employees. Ultimately, the debate between the courts as to whether adhesive arbitration
agreements should be enforced is essentially settled by the Court’s strict enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Further, any limitations on adhesive consumer or employment arbitration agreements
in the near future must come in the form of legislative reform.
III.

ARBITRATION PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT DUE PROCESS
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

TO

VICTIMS

OF

WORKPLACE

While arbitration is a valuable tool for the resolution of disputes in general because of its
private nature and flexible procedures, these very aspects make arbitration an insufficient forum
for the resolution of sexual harassment claims. While resolving these claims in court allows
victims to come forward in the public eye or to file a class action, arbitration allows employers to
prevent a class action suit and to receive a binding judgment that they do not have to disclose
publicly. As a result, victims may never know that other victims exist, and the public may never
know that a corporation’s employees have a history of making sexual harassment claims.
Similarly, the flexibility of the arbitration procedure further allows large corporations to have an
advantage over individual employees in preventing the disclosure of sexual harassment claims.
A. The Antithesis of #MeToo: Silence and Arbitration of Workplace Sexual Harassment
Claims
The private nature of arbitral adjudication in comparison to the public’s access to court
proceedings is one of the most significant problems identified by those who oppose arbitration’s
use in the sexual harassment context.46 Since the inception of the United States and even when the
states were colonies, the courts have played an important role in society.47 Public accountability is
an important aspect of the courts’ role because when brought to court, the accused was at least
theoretically brought before the whole community.48 Another important aspect of the judicial
system is the ability of aggrieved employees to file class actions against their employers. In a
sexual harassment case this can play a major role because an open court class action gives
employees access to knowledge about the claims, which can encourage others to join the action,

45

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. at 1632.

See e.g. letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 9 (“additional concerns arise from the
secrecy requirements of arbitration clauses, which disserve the public interest by keeping both harassment
complaints and any settlements confidential.”)
46

See Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 4 (“even if it is merely a perception, adjudication is indispensable to the integrity
and efficacy of the social, economic, and political order.”)
47

48

Judith Resnik, Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge and Economic Inequalities in Courts and Arbitrations, 96
N.C.L rev. 605, (2018) (early colonial and state constitutions have always contained provisions stating that the
courts should be open so that all might attend).
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and at the settlement stage, knowledge about the reasoning the court employed.49 The class-action
feature of civil litigation is an example of a functional way in which the public is able to gain
knowledge about and participate in litigation against sophisticated players like large
corporations.50 The traditional openness of the courts in the United States functions as “sunshine”
in litigations, shedding light on the proceedings by allowing the public to access them. When
victims are able to air their claims publicly, others are able to learn of their claims, and this
availability of knowledge to the public encourages those who have been harmed to bring their
claims and keeps justice in the public eye.51
By contrast, arbitration is private adjudication by its very definition52 because the parties
to the contract in question set the terms. Parties get to choose the manner of adjudication, who will
adjudicate the claims, and the degree of publicity when an award is rendered.53 Where the contract
is adhesive, often the terms include anonymity.54 Victims are often barred from publicly discussing
their claims because they are asked to sign non-disclosure agreements as part of the arbitration of
sexual harassment claims.55 Further, even where the contract is adhesive, the court has held that it
is constitutional for corporations to insert class action waivers into the employment agreement,
denying claimants the ability to recover as a class.56 Similarly, arbitrators do not have to publish
opinions and are not subject to the judgment of the community in the same way as the judiciary;
even when awards are published, such as by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), the
awards omit the name of the accuser and the accused in order to protect their identities.57Although
this privacy ostensibly protects the claimant, it protects the accused and the employer as well. If
no one ever knows that an employee has been accused of sexual harassment, then the corporation
may not have to fire the accused employee (unless it is part of the arbitral award) and further, the
49

Id., at 613- 615 (resorting to open courts can provide knowledge to the public about the case and about the
reasoning for the result. The increased knowledge decreases the disparity between sophisticated repeat players and
individuals in the court system).
50

Id.

51

Id. at 613, and 626-627 (discussing various state and federal court practices that give the public access to
information about court proceedings and the public’s role in adjudication within the court system).
See Carbonneau, supra note 5 at (“Arbitration is a private process that independently markets its services and pays
its own overhead. There is no political entitlement to, and consequentially no rigorous social or legal regulation of,
arbitration.”)
52

53

See Carbonneau, supra note 12, Ch.1 §3 at 16-23.

54

See Resnik, supra note 43, at 644 (describing the current case law as encouraging an attitude of secrecy and the
common use of impositions of secrecy when agreements to arbitrate are entered into adhesively, such as one which
was under review by the 9th circuit in 2012).
Letter from National Association of Attorneys General supra note 6 (“this veil of secrecy may then prevent other
persons similarly situated from learning of the harassment claims so that they, too, may pursue relief.”)
55

56

See Epic Systems Corp. vs. Lewis, supra note 38.

57

See e.g. 2007 AAA Lexis 37 (an arbitration award where, although published, identities of the corporation,
accused, and accuser have all been omitted).
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corporation does not get a public reputation as a business that employees those who victimize
others.58 Under the current process, it is possible for the accused employee to retain his position
while the employee who brought a claim of sexual harassment to arbitration must remain silent.
The privacy of the arbitral process is a valid tool for commercial disputes, but the value of the
silence encouraged by this private system in the context of sexual harassment claims is certainly
debatable in light of the plethora of victims who have come forward in response to the MeToo
movement in the past year.59
B. Arbitration’s utility as a flexible process can make it an unsuitable forum for the resolution
of workplace sexual harassment claims
Due process -both substantive and procedural- are cornerstones of the American judicial
system. Due process in the court system has arisen out of a set of judicial and statutory rules that
proscribes the rights of those involved in a court proceeding; these apply to both the accused and
the accuser, the plaintiff, and the defendant.60 Unfortunately, these rules that are designed to give
due process to all involved in the judicial process often slow down the pace of adjudication and
create an inflexible and expensive system for dispute resolution.61 The value of arbitration is that
it is not necessarily fettered by any of the rules of procedure which constrain courts.62 Arbitration
is a uniquely flexible process because the terms of the parties’ contract determine the process and
scope of the arbitration. By the same token, arbitration’s very value as a flexible system prevents
it from providing an adequate resolution system in some contexts. For example, it can be
inadequate where both parties did not have equal bargaining power when creating the terms- as in
mandatory arbitration under an employment contract -because the use of arbitration without
oversight can deprive weaker parties of access to the benefits of the judicial system.63 Employers

58

Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a model, 128 Yale L.J. F. 121,
134-135 (2018) (stating that employers benefit from the privacy of arbitration and arbitration settlements and are
often unlikely to remove high level employees accused of harassment unless there is public pressure to do so).
See Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, et. al. “#MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly
Half Their Replacements are Women.” The New York Times, (October 29, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html (outlining 201 different cases of
#MeToo sexual harassment victims coming forward).
59

60

Due process, both procedural and substantive, is an essential consideration in a variety of legal challenges brought
to the Supreme Court. See e.g. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) for a discussion of due process in the civil
context; See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) for a discussion of fundamental rights
implicated in the Due Process Clause; and see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, (2003) for a discussion of due
process in a criminal context.
61

See Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration and The U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform 5 J. Disp. Resol.
231, 238 (1990) (describing the failure of American courts to resolve disputes as a result of procedural processes
designed to protect legal rights).
62

Carbonneau, supra note 5 at 2 (stating that arbitration is valuable to business people because it provides an
effective and efficient and reasonably fair form of justice).
See Carbonneau, supra note 59 (“Advancing arbitral relief as the exclusive remedial standard in the area of
commercial regulation not only divest society of basic governance over such matters, but it could also result in the
63
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gain an advantage in arbitration proceedings by deciding rules when employees unknowingly
agree to terms in adhesive contracts.64 Unlike in the courts, where everyone is held to the same
terms or the established law, the flexibility of arbitration allows arbitrators to render justice
differently in different situations. Arbitrators do not have to consider the law, unless the contract
says so, or can additionally consider industrial factors when making their decisions.65 Arbitrators
under a collective bargaining agreement, for example, first decide culpability and then a remedy
appropriate for the action while courts are asked to strictly determine guilt or non-guilt.66
However, it is true that arbitrators can use a variety of methods to try and ensure fairness in
arbitral proceedings.67 Therefore, arguments are made that the employer’s superior bargaining
power does not necessarily decrease the availability of justice to the employee since after all,
standards and procedures exist to protect the interest of parties under adhesive arbitration
agreements.68 Ultimately, the flexibility of arbitration procedures is exactly what makes arbitration
problematic as a way to adjudicate claims of sexual harassment.
Arbitration’s flexibility ideally allows parties who agree to arbitration to resolve their disputes
in a manner that they choose. However, because employees can agree to arbitration in situations
where they had little or no understanding of the consequences that can stem from agreeing to
arbitrate, employees are effectively deprived of access to the courts for redress of their claims.69
The current decisional law, though, supports enforcing these agreements, necessitating functional
legislation to give employees a meaningful choice as to whether to arbitrate or go to a court of law
for resolution of these disputes.70
loss of the adjudicatory safeguards that proceed from a procedural process built upon public scrutiny, fairness, and a
basic right of appeal- one which entrusts socially divisive issues to an impartial and principled judiciary.”)
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See Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16
Widener L. Rev. 101, 103 (2010) (describing studies finding that arbitration favors sophisticated corporate players
and can be tilted against individuals).
Mollie H. Bowers, E. Patrick McDermott, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Decide” 48
Clev. St. L. Rev. 439, 440 (“Regardless of whether an arbitrator elects to apply external law, he considers broader
concepts of industrial jurisprudence in determining what the remedy shall be. This seems to create a chasm between
arbitral treatment of sexual harassment allegations and that of Federal courts under Title VII.”)
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Id. (stating that an arbitrator’s mandate is to not to consider whether the complainant’s legal rights are violated
(like a court would) but rather whether, in the particular case, the employer proved the conduct and the remedy was
sufficient for that conduct. This implies arbitrators do not consider outside law when rendering their decisions, at
least in the same manner as courts).
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See Hickox, supra note 62 at 108 (describing programs employers can use to create more fair arbitral proceedings
when they seek to compel arbitration; for example, employers can ensure the employee was a participant in
meaningful communications about the arbitration clause in their employment agreement).
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See e.g. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for
Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399 (2000).
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See e.g. Hickox, supra note 62, at 108 (describing case law as accepting the mere presentation of the arbitral
clause in an employee handbook as sufficient to demonstrate an employee’s consent).
Carbonneau, supra note 59 (“the tenor of the current decisional law makes it unlikely that the Court will fashion
for itself and other federal courts an authority sufficient to make the necessary corrections… an intelligent
reordering of arbitration, therefore, can only proceed from a legislative reformation of the enabling statute.”)
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IV.

THE ENDING FORCED ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act would serve as an attempt to remedy
arbitration’s failure to give victims of sexual harassment sufficient due process by preventing
employers from forcing employees who bring claims of sexual harassment into arbitration
proceedings. Under the Act, claims that are considered “sex disputes” would be excluded from
arbitrability.71 The Act defines “sex disputes” as “any dispute between an employee and employer
which would form the basis of a claim based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”72 The
Act would amend the FAA to render any pre-dispute arbitration clauses which purport to govern
these areas unenforceable as a matter of federal law.73 The Act also provides that any questions as
to its applicability should be referred to the courts rather than an arbitrator.74 Given the Supreme
Court’s stance on the strength of the FAA and its supremacy in the field of arbitration, this bill
would be an effective way to change the nearly limitless bounds of arbitrability. In doing so, it
would give those bringing sexual harassment claims fair access to due process, and provide
meaningful reform as one way to destabilize the culture of silence surrounding sexual harassment
that allows those who commit these actions to remain in power. A caveat to the Act’s protections
can be found in § 402(b)(2), which provides that nothing in the chapter applies to contacts between
an employer and a labor organization,75 except that no arbitration agreement waives the
employees’ right to judicial enforcement of statutory claims.76 Although the legislative history
provides no guidance as to why the drafters chose to exempt agreements with labor unions, the
probable reason is that these organizations have developed their own alternative dispute resolution
processes.77 Similarly, the bargaining power between unions and employers is theoretically more
balanced, eliminating some of the fundamental concerns that the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Harassment Act seeks to eliminate for individual employees.

See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017) (“Except as
provided in subsection (b)(2), and notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no pre-dispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”)
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Id., §401.
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Id.

See id., §402(b)(1) (“The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and
enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator,
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in
conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.”)
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Id., §402(b)(2) .

Id., (“…except that no such arbitration provision shall have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek
judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution,
or a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising therefrom.")
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See id. at legislative history; and see Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the
Past Quarter Century, 25 ABA Journal Lab. & Emp. Law 411 (2010) (for a thorough discussion of the evolution of
labor ADR processes).

198

Unfortunately, Congress has shown very little willingness to actually pass this essential
legislation. For example, Congress has rejected other arbitration reform legislation, such as the
Arbitration Fairness Act, which would prevent the inclusion of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in contracts.78 Congress has not acted despite continuing public discourse about the problems
surrounding sexual harassment and abuse and the silence that their victims are encouraged to
maintain.79 As the MeToo movement approaches its one year anniversary of existence, some
powerful figures such as Gretchen Carlson, who came forward about the sexual harassment she
endured under Roger Ailes for years, have called for the passage of the Act.80 Similarly, some
corporations, such as Microsoft, have acted on their own to remove adhesive arbitration clauses
from their employment contracts.81 Congress has not acted despite powerful market statements
like these. While federal legislation is the best way to achieve meaningful reform, it is not the only
solution.
V.

STATES SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF AND LEARN LESSONS FROM STATES THAT
HAVE ALREADY ENACTED REFORM MEASURES

The states should act to protect their citizens in light of Congress’s unwillingness to pass
meaningful reform legislation. States should act to rectify the due process concerns expressed by
the State Attorneys General when they argued for the passage of the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Harassment Act82 because arbitration deprives claimants of due process. The largest
difficulty for state legislators in this area is the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about arbitration;
the Supreme Court has held a multitude of times that the FAA preempts state law.83 Thus, state
legislators must enact legislation that does not directly contradict the FAA in order to withstand
judicial scrutiny.
See Morgan Stanley, Sixth Time’s the Charm: Rethinking the Arbitration Fairness Act to Achieve Practical
Reform, 10 Arb. L. Rev. 199 (2019) (for a discussion of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act and Congressional
reluctance to pass arbitration reform).
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See e.g. Ellen Bravo, Are we at a tipping point on sexual misconduct?, Quartz at Work, (Oct. 2, 2018) (discussing
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See Nick Wingfield and Jessica Silver-Green, Microsoft Moves to End Secrecy in Sexual Harassment Claims, The
New York Times, (Dec. 19, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/technology/microsoft-sexual-harassmentarbitration.html (“Microsoft, one of the world’s biggest software makers, said on Tuesday that it had eliminated
forced arbitration agreements with employees who make sexual harassment claims and was also supporting a
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See Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, supra note 6 (“ending mandatory arbitration of sexual
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victims.”)
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Several states, including New York and Vermont, have already taken action in this area and
can be used as examples of possible types of legislation that would help provide due process to
employees bringing sexual harassment claims.84 New York has taken radical action and simply
made pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims illegal and unenforceable.85 It
appears that New York’s legislators attempted to circumvent federal preemption by including the
language “except where inconsistent with federal law,” into the provision,86 but the New York
approach still has its limitations as a reform measure. New York’s legislation attempts to achieve
what Congress has not, preventing the inclusion of “mandatory arbitration” of “sexual
harassment”87 clauses in employment contracts but similarly retains an exception for collective
bargaining agreements.88 However, if New York’s law is challenged in federal court, it is unlikely
that even the exclusion of inconsistent federal law provision would be sufficient to prevent the
Court from enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements,89 even if the parties specifically invoke
New York law.90
Vermont’s legislators took a slightly more nuanced approach when they enacted legislation in
May of 2018 that would not invalidate agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims per se, (in
fact, the legislation does not even refer to arbitration by name) but amend Vermont’s employment
regulations to set limitations on what employers could ask employees to agree to in their
employment contracts related to sexual harassment claims in general.91 The legislation prohibits
employers from requiring any employee to sign agreements which would prevent the employee’s
participation in an investigation relating to or disclosure of sexual harassment,92 and requires that
“an agreement to settle a claim of sexual harassment” must expressly state that it does not restrict
the employee’s rights to pursue relief in any other forum.93 Vermont’s approach is more functional
84

Porter Wells, States Take Up #MeToo Mantle in Year After Weinstein, Bloomberg Law (Oct. 3, 2018)
https://www.bna.com/states-metoo-mantle-n73014482949/ (thirty-two states introduced MeToo related legislation,
but only four, Maryland, New York, Vermont, and Washington, have enacted legislation to limit mandatory
arbitration specifically).
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See N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 75 §7515 (2018).
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Id., at §7515(b)(i).
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Id. at §7515(a), §7514(b).

Id., §7515(c) (“where there is a conflict between any collective bargaining agreement and this section, such
agreement shall be controlling.”)
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But see Volt Info. Scis. V. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“… it does not follow that the FAA prevents
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the act itself.”)
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21 Vt. Stat. Ann. §495h (2018) amended by Vt. H.B. 707 (May 28, 2018).
See id. at §(G)(1)(A).
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Id. at §G(1)(B) (prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign agreements which (except as otherwise
permitted by state and federal law) waive procedural rights and remedies available to the employee making the
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than New York’s, which expressly bans a type of arbitration agreement, but could still be
invalidated by the Court if challenged along the same general reasoning the court employed in
Southland Corp. v. Keating.94 However, overall Vermont has taken an approach that provides
choice for employees while not depriving parties of the ability to arbitrate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While no state has passed perfect legislation to address mandatory arbitration’s shortcomings
as the adjudicatory method for employment sexual harassment claims, the growing trend of states
acting to provide increased protections for these employees is a sign that state governments, at
least, understand the importance of legislation to make meaningful reform in the employment
arbitration arena. Although each state reform measure must confront the Supreme Court’s
sweeping jurisprudence regarding the emphatic public policy favoring arbitration, the efforts made
in states like New York, and Vermont to create laws that will provide protection as well as honor
the judicial policy should serve as examples that other states can follow. States should continue to
experiment with policies that will address the concerns raised by the public and their own
Attorneys General. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the pressures of the MeToo Movement
and the efforts of the states to regulate arbitration may, (and should) serve as the political impetus
needed to persuade Congress to pass the Act, which would provide reform, address due process
concerns, and is the most likely avenue for arbitration reform that would withstand judicial
scrutiny.
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See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that Congress intended to foreclose the ability of state
legislators to create laws that directly opposed the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA).
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